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UNCLE SAM, YOUR SILENT PARTNER
H. SHIELDS MASON
of the Denver Bar

When you sit down at the end of the month to figure out
what you have collected in fees and whether you have enough
left in the bank to meet your next month's bills for office rent,
stenographer, telephone, etc., not to mention your grocery bills
and household expenses, it is easy to overlook the fact that whatever balance you may have on hand is far from being your own
to spend or to do with as you please. If you are like many lawyers that I know, you will get a rude awakening once every three
months, or an even heavier "jolt" once a year, when you have to
distribute to the Director of Internal Revenue Uncle Sam's share
of profits which you thought were yours to keep and which you
and your wife may have long since spent.
If you are on a salary and your employer has been withholding a part of your earnings each month to distribute to Uncle
Sam, it is even harder for you to realize to what extent he has
had his hand in your pocket for his share of your profits, because
you are taking your "anesthetic" in smaller doses and being
gradually lulled into believing that the net you receive is all that
you have coming for your sweat and worry anyway. Actually,
however, you have earned or produced far more than you have
gotten for your endeavors, but your silent partner-Uncle Sam,
has been pushing down the "no sale" key of your cash register
and steadily and stealthily relieving you of a very substantial
part of the earnings and profits that your efforts, and yours alone,
have produced.
When you take out your check book to settle up the accounts
of your partnership and find that you have been relieved of approximately one-fourth of all your net earnings, whether by
small monthly payments or larger quarterly payments, I am sure
you will understand what is meant by the title that I have chosen.
If this was all your silent partner got, it might not be so bad, but
this is only the beginning, for the more you make the more he
gets, until you finally reach a point where Uncle Sam's share is
approximately 90% and yours is only 10%, yet you did nothing
to bring about this unfair, uneven, confiscatory method of splitting
your profits, except to work a little harder and sweat a few more
buckets of blood, and wind up earning too much money according
to Uncle's standards. If the average American wasn't always in
quest of the almighty dollar and hell-bent with the idea of making
more and more money, because his neighbor's wife's husband has
a friend who makes $50,000 or $100,000 a year, Uncle might
find himself in a position where you as his partner would change
into a drone and decide not to produce so much honey. However,
he knows that you are a sucker and a glutton for punishment, and
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although you threaten to quit producing, you won't as long as
you have a breath of life left in you.
Income taxation in theory is supposed to be the fairest method
of taxing man's property, because it was based upon the taxpayer's ability to pay, i.e., the more a man has or makes, the more
tax he is able to pay. However, in practice, it doesn't necessarily
work this way.
In recent years it seems that the plan of the Government
economists and so-called tax experts has changed considerably.
The idea of income taxation no longer seems to be based principally on a man's ability to pay-for the rates are now so high
that it is just as much a burden for the poor man to pay the tax
as the rich man-but upon the idea that there should be a redistribution of weath, by taking it away by taxation from those
that have it, and giving it to those that don't have it, by means
of Government doles, subsidies and old age pensions. Eventually,
if this idea is continued, the vast majority of the people in their
old age will be entirely dependent upon the Government for their
support and means of livelihood. It has always been hard for the
average person to save something to live on in his old age, but it
is next to impossible now with the present cost of living and high
rates of taxes. Now where does the lawyer fit into this scheme
of things?
Income taxation has always been unfair so far as the professional man is concerned. An owner of an oil well is permitted
to deduct annually an allowance for depletion, obsolescence and
depreciation. A lawyer whose assets are primarily his time and
his brain, receives no credit whatsoever for the rapid depletion
of his time nor is he allowed to set up reserves against the obsolescence and deterioration of his physical and mental capacities.
Furthermore he is not allowed to recover the costs of his education which is his chief tool. More and more wage earners are
being covered and protected in their old age by social security
and pension plans. But a lawyer has no social security except what
he can make for himself by saving his money for old age or investing in insurance which will provide him with an income when he
reaches a certain age. Most lawyers make a good living, yes, but
you could always count the ones on the fingers of your two hands,
who ever really got rich out of fees earned solely from the practice of law as such. So, what should we do to be saved, and before
we go over the hill to the poorhouse?
The prospects, at the moment anyway, are none too bright.
One thing that would help us greatly is the passage of certain
legislation similar to what has been proposed in the House of
Representatives in Washington. The general purpose and idea of
House Bills 10 and 11 has been summarized in the testimony of
Leslie M. Rapp of the New York City Bar as follows:
The purpose of this bill, the Keogh-Reed Bill (now
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known as Jenkins-Keogh, re-introduced 1/3/53), is to
remove the present discrimination against large groups
of our citizens in regard to the establishment of private
pension plans. It would accomplish this by the simple
expedient of permitting the postponement of income tax
with respect to a limited portion of earned income paid
into a so-called restricted retirement fund. The amount
so excluded, plus each participant's share of the earnings
of the fund, would be taxed in later years when drawn
down as pension benefits.
See in this connection an excellent article by Earl S. MacNeill and Gordon T. Wallis, both of Irving Trust Co., New York,
in April, 1953, issue of Dicta entitled "Tax Favored Pensions in
Sight for the Self-employed." Both of our Bar Associations have
adopted resolutions favoring this legislation.
A pension plan for lawyers has, I believe, been long ago sug7
gested as a means of building up a savings fund in the form of
a small monthly payment, which in time would be used as a pension to be returned to the participants when they reached the
age where they are too old to practice. This would be an excellent
method for you younger lawyers to built up an estate, but any
such plan should go a step further and contemplate the amendment of the tax laws, to provide for the exclusion of the amount
paid in, from earned income during the year in which it is paid.
Thus such savings would be tax free until returned in the form
of a pension in later years, when your income would not be so
great, and the rate of tax correspondingly lower. I would seriously recommend to the consideration of you younger lawyers of
the Junior Bar Conference, such a program, looking towards the
amendment of the State Income Tax law in this connection. If
legislation is passed in Congress and at the State level, the savings should prove far more valuable to you, than anything I have
to offer you as to how we are to protect ourselves from further
financial loss under the present tax set up.
The only way we have today of saving taxes, is by knowing
what items are deductible from our gross receipts, so as to cut
down our net taxable income, and to take the fullest advantage
possible of these deductions when computing Uncle's share of our
profits. After all, it's your money and you should be interested
in keeping as much of it as possible. However, I am inclined to
believe that a number of lawyers spend far more time figuring
out their client's deductions than they do on their own deductions.
A lawyer just naturally neglects his own business for his client's,
and filling out his own income tax return is no exception, and is
usually put off until the last minute when he is apt to overlook claiming some expense deductions to which he is entitled. I even know
some attorneys who do not take the time to fill out their own
returns and leave such matters to their office girl, or accountant.
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The C.P.A. has already taken far too much of the lawyer's tax
practice away from him, for him to turn his own personal tax
business over also. If you do not know what your deductions are,
then the chances are better than even that you haven't got them
down in your books when you turn them over to your C.P.A. or
office girl. They can only work with the figures you give them
and upon which your tax return is based. Have you often wondered whether you have claimed all of the deductions you are
entitled to? How do you know? Well take a little time gentlemen,
to find out. Joe Blow's business is not that important, and in
a night's time or part of day, you can learn what to claim as deductions and how much. But this is not all you have to do. Once
you know what you can claim, you've got to start puttings things
down in a book, kept for that purpose. It might prove valuable
in helping to convince Uncle Sam at a later date that you spent
the money for that purpose.' If nothing else, keep your office bank
account and your home bank accounts separate, remember to pay
everything by check, not cash, unless you get a receipt for it. At
the end of the year when you go over your checks, you will be
surprised to learn that there are some items which you probably
can claim as deductions on your income tax, and which you had
long since forgotten about.
Be reasonable when you start to figure up the amount of your
deductions. If you are reasonable with Uncle Sam, he will be
reasonable with you. If nothing else, your own conscience will
probably tell you when you are claiming too much for the operation of your car for business as against family use, or when you
are including too much expense for entertainment of clients out
of the total of your country club bill. Remember the burden of
proving such items is on you. How are you going to prove them
in the first instance if you haven't kept a record, and in the second place, unless they are reasonable? Each case varies on fact
as you know, and yours may be an exceptional one. What is reasonable for me to claim for entertainment expense would not
necessarily be the same for you. It depends on the facts. It is
not a set figure, or a percentage of your gross earnings, it varies
each year. If the amount you have claimed is high, don't be afraid
to attach a statement to your return explaining why, so Uncle
will not wonder too much and summon you over for a short conference in his chambers.
Here is a list of some of the things you may be able to claim,
and which you may have overlooked in preparing your tax return,
namely:
1. Cost of Supplies-i.e., postage, stationery, cards, legal
blanks. Don't pay cash without a receipt.
2. Pro-rated Costs of operating an automobile used for business-including depreciation, garage or parking rent, gasoline,
insurance, oil, repairs, tires, license fees, interest, etc., based on
ISee

note 1.
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a percentage of mileage driven for business as against family use.
3. Dues 2 to professional societies but not to strictly social
clubs, i.e., golf, athletic, etc., except to the extent such a club is
used for professional purpose, i.e., entertainment of clients.
4. Office rent.
5. Cost of fuel, light, water, telephone, telegraph.
6. Salaries of office assistants, i.e., stenographer, clerk.
7. If useful life of furniture, equipment or books is short
(less than one year) amounts currently expended are deductible
in the year of payment or accrual. The cost of information services, such as Federal or State Tax Reporters, Unemployment Reporters, Labor and Law, Trade Regulation Reporters, Inheritance
Tax Reporters, and other law reporters, is deductible by lawyers
who must buy such services in connection with the performance
of their duties. Where the life of such services or books is over
one year, or such volumes have a more permanent value to the
profession of the taxpayer, their cost should be capitalized and
made the subject of a depreciation allowance. In this connection
the U. S. Treasury Department has published in Bulletin "F" a
list of Estimated Useful Lives and Depreciation Rates. This
bulletin is readily available in tax services or you can write to
the Government Printing Office and obtain one. Some of the
more common items found in lawyer's offices are:

Safes -------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - - ------50 years
Furniture, fixtures & filing cases ---------------------------20 years
A dding m achines --------------..------..-----------------.........
10 years
B ook C a ses ................................................................-2 0 y ea rs
Check W riters ------------------------------------------------------ 8 years
Clocks ----------------------------------------------------------15 years
Dictating machines ---------------------------------------------- 6 years
Electric fans ----------------------------------------------------10 years
Rugs, carpets, mats ---------------------------------------------- 10 years
Scales - mail -----------------------------------------------------10 years
Typewriters -----------------------------------------------------5 years
You divide the "useful life" into 100 to obtain the depreciation
rate. Used items do not have as long a life as new ones. Another
suggestion is the amortizing of office structural improvements,
such as partitions, etc., over the term of your lease which may be
less than the expected useful life of the leasehold improvement.
8. Expenses
incurred in attending Bar Conventions or legal
3
institutes.
9. Flowers for funerals of deceased clients.
10. Accountant's fees.
11. Bad debts-but only if you have reported the income for
services rendered on an accrual basis.
12. Contributions.
See note 3.
See note 3.
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13. Cost of successful defense
4 of disbarment proceedings.
14. Entertainment of clients.
15. Interest paid on business indebtedness.
16. Cost of professional journals, magazine subscriptions for
your office waiting room.
17. Repairs to your business property.
18. Business safe deposit box rental.
19. Travel expenses not reimbursed by client.
20. Split fees.
21. Taxes and insurance on business property.
22. Cost of announcements.
23. Chamber of Commerce dues if you belong for business
reasons.
24. Theft or fire loss not compensated by insurance.
There is one further so-called "break" for lawyers in the income tax laws as presently devised. Section 107 of the Internal
Revenue Code allows an individual who has performed services
over a 36 month period and who receives a full payment or substantially a full payment for those services all in one year, to spread
such income back over the 36 months period instead of reporting
the full payment as income during the year of its receipt. It frequently happens, for example in the handling of estates, or in long
and protracted cases involving several trials, appeals, etc., that a
lawyer's services will extend over a period of years, and although
he may get a small retainer to start with, or during the handling
of the matter, the main bulk of his fee will be paid to him at the
end of the performance of his duties. To take advantage of the
relief as afforded by Section 107, you must show that the following
requirements are satisfied:
(a) The income in question is compensation for personal
services.
(b)
There was a period of 36 calendar months from the beginning to the completion of such services.
(c)
At least 80% of the total compensation for such services
was received or accrued in one tax year.
In order to gain any advantage in this method of reporting
your income, it will be necessary to first, find the increase in your
tax for the year of receipt caused by the inclusion in gross income
of the sum you received and secondly, to compare such increase with
the total taxes that would have been payable, if the compensation
had actually been received and taxed in the prior years to which
it is allocated. It may work out that it is cheaper for you to include all of your fee in the year actually received or accrued, and
therefore, this provision may not always work to your advantage.
In conclusion let me again caution you to keep records of
everything you spend if you do not wish Uncle Sam to get more
than his fair share of your profits.
4 See

note 9.
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1.

PROOF AND RECORDS

An Attorney's business expense deductions were disallowed,
when he asked deduction for each of the four years of more than
$36,000, represented by personal checks cashed -by him in those
years and the proceeds carried in pocket and expended for obligations calling for cash expenditures, no record being kept of such
expenditures and petitioner being unable to state in any instance
the amount of the payment or to whom made. (Noell, 21 BTA 1107,
Dec. 6617).
Lacking proof of any exact or even approximate amount expended by an attorney for taxi cab fare from his office to various
courts in which he practiced, cost of entertaining clients and witnesses in course of trial and cost of preparing his cases, but being
convinced that he did spend something for such expenses, the tax
court allowed $200 instead of $780 claimed as ordinary and necessary business expense. (Lavin, T C memo., 3 T C M 228., Dec. 13,
808 (M).
Taxpayer used his office in connection with his practice of law
and for other business activities. His gross income from the practice of law in 1936 was $400, being applied to his rent of the office.
The Circuit Court allowed additional office expenses, but refused
to allow claimed expenses, aggregating $1,458.45 because of lack
of proof. The Circuit Court also disallowed $83, for automobile
insurance as a business expense because of lack of proof that the
automobile was used for business purposes. Bennett v. Com (CCA8) 44 - 1 V S T C Par. 9152, 139 Fed. (2d) 961.
2.

AUTOMOBILE EXPENSE

A lawyer may deduct cost of carrying his card in newspapers,
cost of listing his name with credit and collecting agencies, and
cost of upkeep, including depreciation of an automobile based
upon the proportion of time used for business, but not in going
from his home to his office and returning (II. 1933, III-1 CB 122).
3.

DUES
Bar Association dues are deductible by attorneys as professional expenses (Keith, T C memo, op., 1 TCM 184, Dec. 12, 908-G).
In 1941, a case was brought before the District Court for the
Southern District of California (Todd W. Johnson vs. U. S. (DC)
42-1 USTC, Par. 9180, 45 Fed. Supp. 377), wherein taxpayer, an
attorney, apparently proved all the facts necessary to constitute
the "substantial" evidence necessary to establish a right to claim
a deduction for Club dues. He testified that he did not enjoy
playing golf himself because he felt he should be working at the
office; that green fees and food for his prospective clients constituted the largest items on his monthly club bill; that the club dues
and expenses were charged as business expenses on the books of
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the partnership; that large fees were collected by means of contacts made at the club; and that several clients would not come to
the office; that three estates were obtained through his contacts,
from which fees were obtained in the aggregate of over $50,000;
that he visited the country club only when he felt it absolutely
necessary; and that his membership was discontinued whenever
this method of obtaining business became unprofitable. The Court
held that under the facts of this particular case, the plaintiff should
be allowed as a deduction for business expense, the amount paid for
club dues.
When the purpose of a lawyer in joining several social clubs
was to have available facilities for entertainment of his clients,
deduction was allowed of 50% of the membership dues and 50%
of the house bills (Armstrong, Par. 47, 245 P-H. Memo T C). Apportioned deductions for dues and entertainment expenses at golf
club also allowed attorneys in (Hussey, Par. 52, 039 P-H Memo TC,
11 TCM 141, Dec. 18, 790 (M) ; Guggenheimer, 18 TC - (No. 10) ).
4.

DAMAGES - ORDINARY AND NECESSARY EXPENSES.

Includes damages paid by lawyer to client whose interest he
failed to protect (Cochrane, 23 BTA 202). However, an attorney
zannot deduct $5,000.00 voluntarily paid on behalf of a bankrupt
client, by reason of a moral obligation to vindicate representations
made to the client's creditors and compromise claims. (Lee M.
Friedman v. Delany (CA-i) 49 - 1 U.S.T.C. 9106, 171 Fed. 2d, 269.
Cert. denied, 336 U. S. 936).
A CLIENT
Are they deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense during the years paid out, if included in income when you
are reimbursed for them? The answer is, no. Such disbursements
are in the nature of loans and hence are not deductible. The repayment of costs advanced do not constitute taxable income.
Sums expended to develop political influence, on which taxpayers law business was mainly dependent, are not deductible as
ordinary and necessary expenses. (McGlue, 45 BTA 761, Dec. 12,
173 (Acq) ).
5.

COSTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF

6.

SALARIES.

A lawyer may not offset against his income from his profession the salaries of assistants and other expenses of his business
of making and registering bets at licensed race tracks from which
he realized no gain. (Silberman, 44 BTA 600, Dec. 11, 832.)
7.

PUBLICATIONS.

Cost of "Current legal publications of short life," and portion of upkeep and expenses of car used partly in business were
allowed an attorney (Julius I. Peyser, TC memo Op. 1 TCM 807,
Dec. 13, 076 (M) ).
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CONVENTION EXPENSES - DEDUCTIBLE.

Lawyer attending American Bar Association (Ellis, 15 BTA
1075, aff. 50 F. (2d) 343, 9 AFTR 1662) but not a trip to Europe
to investigate criminal procedure.
However, State Bar Examination fees and traveling expenses
incident thereto (0 D 452, 2 C B 157) are not deductible. Expenses
incurred by a lawyer in attending a conference on Federal taxation
at N. Y. University is deductible (Geo. C. Coughlin, 18 TC - No.
64. Dec. 19, 034). Claimed loss on an unsuccessful attempt to gain
admission to a State Bar was disallowed (Banigan, Par. 51, 177
P-H Memo TC.)
9. ENTERTAINMENT - Includes home expenses and caterers.
Entertainment expenses of an attorney in obtaining new
clients allowed in (Johnson vs. U. S. 45 F. Supp. 377, 29 AFTR
841).
Cost of entertaining clients allowed (Jacobson, 6 TC 1048).
10.

TRAVELING EXPENSES.

Expenses incurred in connection with professional business
and expenses of entertaining clients are deductible (Earl King, 9
BTA 502, Dec. 3177 (Acq.) ).
However, the tax Court will not take judicial notice that it is
advisable from a business viewpoint for one engaged in the practice of law to entertain clients from time to time. (Lorenz, TC
memo. 8 TCM 720, Dec. 17, 155 (M) ).

LAWYERS TO EXAMINE THE COLORADO
REVISED STATUTES, 1953
In 1951 the 38th General Assembly of the State of Colorado
provided for the creation of the Office of the Revisor of Statutes and
authorized a new compilation of all Colorado Laws. Thereafter,
Mr. Charles M. Rose, an attorney of Pueblo, Colorado, was appointed Revisor of Statutes. Mr. Rose was successful in obtaining
a highly competent staff of assistants and completed a compilation in time for presentation to the 39th General Assembly in
January of 1953. This report was contained in eight volumes
and was adopted by the legislature which provided that the compilation should be known as the "Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953".
In an answer to interrogatories filed by the House of Representatives the Colorado Supreme Court has declared that this compilation of laws, when it becomes effective, will be the law rather
than prima facie evidence of the law as were previous compilations.
The compiling and revising of all of the laws of any states is
a monumental undertaking and it is inevitable that in any work
of such a size some error, typographical or otherwise, must exist
however competent and careful the revisor and proof readers
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might be. Since the Revisor's report was adopted by the legislature earlier this year, some errors have been called to the attention
of the Bar Association or the Revisor and it is felt that every
lawyer in the state should have an opportunity to inspect this eight
volume report and examine it for other possible errors. The printing of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, will not begin until
after the next short session of the legislature in January, 1954. and
an opportunity will be provided for legislative correction of all errors which might be contained in the Revisor's report. Each lawyer
should make an effort to examine the report and such statutes as
might be of particular interest to him and to report all possible
errors to Mr. Charles M. Rose, Revisor of Statutes, State Capitol
Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
Arrangements have been made to have copies of the Revisor's
eight volume report available in the District Court Houses in 23
counties throughout the state. In some counties these will be found
in the District Court library and, in others, in the office of the
Clerk of the District Court. The clerk will be able to inform each
lawyer where the report is on display during this period.
The Colorado Bar Association expresses its appreciation to
the members of the 39th General Assembly, the District Judges
of Colorado, and Mr. Rose for their cooperation in this project
and for making available to Colorado lawyers copies of the Revisor's report. These reports will be available from August 1. 1953
to November 1, 1953 in District Court Houses at the following
locations:
First Judicial District-Brighton, Golden, Littleton
Second Judicial District-Denver (District Court Law
Library)
Third Judicial District- Trinidad, Walsenburg
Fourth Judicial District-Colorado Springs
Fifth Judicial District-Leadville
Sixth Judicial District-Durango
Seventh Judicial District-Grand Junction, Montrose
Eighth Judicial District-Boulder, Fort Collins, Greeley
Ninth Judicial District-Glenwood Springs
Tenth Judicial District-Pueblo
Eleventh Judicial District-Canon City
Twelfth Judicial District-Alamosa
Thirteenth Judicial District-Sterling, Fort Morgan
Fourteenth Judicial District-Steamboat Springs
Fifteenth Judicial District-Lamar
Sixteenth Judicial District-La Junta
Each lawyer is urged to examine the report as carefully as
possible and to inform Mr. Charles M. Rose of errors which need
correction. Bear in mind that the report has already received
legislative approval and will become law without further legislative action.
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THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
AND ANTI-TRUST LAWS
WILLIAM R. WARD*

The underlying idea of a cooperative organization is that a
business owned by its customers, managed under their direction
and having no legitimate loyalties except to them has a better
chance to meet their needs than one owned and managed by outsiders. A Cooperative Marketing Association may be defined as
a group of producers working together to sell their products
without competing against one another.1
The legal status of the cooperative form is so vague that it
is necessary to examine the relationship between the cooperative
and its members, as expressed in its by-laws, articles of incorporation and contractual agreements with its members to decide
if it is a "true" cooperative. The four basic principles or cornerstones of the cooperative form of organization are:
(1)
The legally enforceable obligation of the cooperative as a legal entity to return to its member and
patrons in proportion to their patronage, all surplus over
and above operating expenses.
(2) A membership open to all without discrimination. It follows from this that the value of a share will
automatically remain at par and that a transfer of a
share of the variable capital of a cooperative will not be
an impersonal stock exchange transaction.
(3) The equality of voting rights of all members
regardless of number of shares held by the member.
This democratic control means that the cooperative is
essentially an association of persons and not of capital.
(4) A limited or fixed rate of return on the invested
capital so that the cooperative shares are in the nature of
an indebtedness and are not entrepreneurial."
While the legislatures and courts of this country have not
been uniform in their recognition of these basic distinctions of
the cooperative form from other business forms, in this country
it may be said that the first, at least, is essential.:,
The chief uses of the cooperative form in the United States
have been:
(1) Agricultural producers cooperatives, for the sale and
processing of produce.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
I Vernon A. Mund, Government
and Business, p. 218.
2 Barnes,
Cooperatives in International Trade, 1950 Wisconsin Law Review 266.
'Charles Bunn, Consumer Cooperatives and Price Fixing Laws, 40 Michigan Law Review 165.
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(2)

Producers Cooperatives, for the purchase and manufacture of productive equipment and supplies.
(3) Merchant Cooperatives, for the manufacture and purchase of merchandise.
(4) Consumer Cooperatives, for the manufacture,
purchase
4
and supply of all kinds of goods and services.
It should be noted, that in the past, there has been a growing
tendency toward an integrated cooperative, combining types one
and four above, and that until fairly recently, the dominant use
of the cooperative type organization has been in the agricultural
areas. There are several facts which encourage agricultural cooperative growth. First, the basic American tradition of helping
one's neighbor, which is especially strong in the rural area, for
example, in the custom of exchanging work and use of machinery,
early day "Barn Raisings", etc. Second, the low income of the
American farmer,6 encouraging economy in purchases and maximum return on all sales, which aims the cooperative form seems
best suited to serve. Third, is the farmers' distrust and dislike
of "big business", even though only local big business. Fourth,
the lack of bargaining power of the individual farmer.
Recognizing the need and value of the cooperative form, most
states have special legislative provisions for the formation of
cooperatives, which although varying greatly in requirements, do
provide the legal machinery for creation of such associations or
corporations.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 18906 expressed the economic
policy of free competition, declaring that every restraint of trade
and commerce is unlawful. The basic rule of Anti-Trust Legislation, that every unit of the economy should act independently in
price determination is in direct conflict with the basic rule of the
cooperative, substitution of concerted action for competition in the
sale of their produce. The Sherman Act in thus creating a barrier
to concerted action in price making made no provision for the
exemption or exclusion of cooperatives. Many states, following
the lead of Congress, passed similar anti-trust laws. However, the
state legislatures, especially those of the agricultural states, were
more sensitive to pressure from the Farm Bloc, and many of the
early state statutes exempted agricultural cooperatives from their
operation. In Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that such an exception, that of Illinois which
said:
The provisions of this act shall not apply to agricultural products or livestock while in the hands of the
producer or raiser.
4 Note

3, stpra.
Report of Department of Commerce, "National Income by Industrial Origin", July 1947, showing that even in the current era of farm prosperity, farmers
comprising 20% of the national population received only 10% of the national
income.
15 USC, Sec. 1 to 8.
'184 U.S. 540, 22 S. Ct. 431 (1901).
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was unconstitutional in that it contravened the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
With this denial of exclusion by the basic Federal law and
the Supreme Court's refusal to uphold the exclusion obtained
under the state law, Agricultural Cooperatives were faced by the
alternatives of openly violating the law or taking steps to change
the law, and as violation of the law was prohibitive, their alternatives boiled down to those expressed by Mr. Olds, Chairman of
United States Steel Corporation, following the outlawing of the
use of the basing point system in the Cement case, that the industry is "faced with two alternatives-either to seek remedial legislation or to educate the supreme Court". 8 The Agricultural Cooperative movement, through the Farm Bloc utilized both alternatives.
As to the exclusion by the states of agricultural cooperatives
from the operation of their anti-trust laws, there was a gradual
erosion of the holding in the Connolly case, first by the Court's
recognition of the power of the states to authorize farmers to
cooperate in marketing their own products in Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-overative Marketing Association 9 which distinguished the Connolly case on the basis of the
classification involved, until ultimately in Tigner v. Texas, 10 the
Connolly case was flatly overruled, with Justice Frankfurter stating that it was a proper exercise of legislative discretion based
on economic differences between farmer-producers and urban business organizations, that due to the peculiar economic condition
of the former, it was a reasonable classification. It should be noted
that the Texas statute contained an exclusion for agricultural and
livestock cooperatives. Frankfurter stated:
Since Connoly's case was decided, nearly forty years
ago, an impressive legislative movement bears witness
to general acceptance of the view that the differences between agriculture and industry call for differentiation
in the formulation of public policy. The States as well as
the United States have sanctioned cooperative action by
farmers; have restricted their amenability to the antitrust laws; have relieved their organizations from taxation.
This
lic policy,
That the
trated by
where a

clearly indicates the Court's shift of attitude as to pubthe "education of the Supreme Court" appears complete.
shift was limited to Agricultural Cooperatives is illusthe holding in Midland Cooperative Wholesale v. Ickes,1
consumers cooperative 12 sought the protection of the

S Journal of Commerce, April 28, 1948.

1'276 U.S. 71, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928).
" 310 U.S. 141, 60 S. Ct. 879 (1940).
" 125 F. 2d 618 (CCA 8th, 1942).
15 USC Sec. 833 (i) (13).
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Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 which provides that it shall not be
an unfair method of competition or a violation of the code to sell
to or through a bona-fide and legitimate farmers' cooperative organization, the court held that consumer cooperatives did not fall
within the provision, and upheld the classification, saying:
Congress had the right to discriminate between the
types of cooperatives and it manifestly did so, and the
failure to treat them alike is neither novel nor unreasonable. Laws fostering cooperative marketing and purchasing by farmers have a common genealogy. They stem
from a desire on the part of federal and state legislators
to extend to farmers ways to enable them to
counteract
13
the effects of an increasing urban economy.
The effort by the Farm Bloc for remedial federal legislation
first bore fruit in Sec. 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914,14 which provides:
Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profits, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under
the anti-trust laws.
Further approval of the cooperative form, at least for the
farmer, broadening it to include capital stock, corporate associations and concerted action on selling and pricing was granted in
the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 15 with this provision:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural
products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut
or fruit growers may act together, in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in
collectively processing, preparing for market, handling
and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such
products of persons so engaged. Such associations may
have marketing agencies in common and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes.
The act stipulated that to come within its provisions, the
cooperative must: (1) operate for the mutual benefit of its members, (2) allow each member to have only one vote or limit divi13 supra.

" 15 USC Sec. 8 et seq.
" 7 USC Sec. 291, 292.
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dends on stock to 8% per year, (3) not deal in products of nonmembers to a greater extent than products of members. The privilege granted of acting in concert with respect to prices was limited
to the extent that it must not "unduly enhance" the price by reason thereof, granting the Secretary of Agriculture rather than
the Department of Justice the power to scrutinize prices, and
empowering him to issue a complaint if the price is "unduly enhanced", and after hearing to issue a cease and desist order if
the complaint is justified. This appears to be a very broad exemption from the anti-trust laws for the agricultural cooperative.
Congress again smiled upon the agricultural cooperative in 1937,
with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 6 authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture
to enter into marketing agreements with processors, producers, associations of producers, and others engaged in
the handling of any agricultural commodity or product
thereof
and then providing that:
the making of such agreement shall not be held to be in
violation of any of the anti-trust laws of the United States,
and any such agreement shall remain in force after the
termination of said sections.
The "marketing agreement" was a carry-over of the 1933
New Deal program aimed at giving the farmer a parity price,
and, to enhance the price of farm produce, authorized production
control and marketing agreements. These agreements may fix
minimum prices handlers can pay through a control board selected
by the Secretary of Agriculture. However, the specific price is
not fixed, and the primary aim of the agreement is to control the
price by limiting the supply delivered to each market which is
done through the control board.
The above three acts constitute the basic legislative exclusion
of the agricultural cooperative from the federal anti-trust laws.
Concurrently, other legislative favors were being granted. The
Stockyard Act of 1921,17 and the Grain Futures Act of 1922 1
both specifically limited to agricultural cooperatives an exclusion
from the act to such cooperatives' patronage dividends; The Robinson Patman Act, 9 in forbidding price discrimination, provided
by Section 4 that the act does not prohibit a cooperative from
making a patronage dividend; the Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926 20 providing for research and advisory services for cooperatives by the Department of Agriculture; there are also favorable
7 USC Sec. 601 et seq.
'7 USC Sec. 181 et seq.
"42 Stat. L. 998.
"49 Stat. L. 1526, 15 USC See. 13 et seq.
:' 12 Stat. L. 998, 1001.
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provisions in others such as the Bituminous Coal Act, Rural Electrification Act, etc.
That Congress has approved the cooperative form of business organization is manifest from the above. First reading of
the above statutes would indicate that Congress intended to vest
in the Secretary of Agriculture the exclusive power to enforce
the federal anti-trust laws as to agricultural cooperatives, and
to exclude such cooperatives from the operation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law. Before making too hasty a determination of the
effect of these statutes, one should examine the judicial construction they have received.
That Section 6 of the Clayton Act did not exclude farm cooperatives from the Sherman Act was shown by the case of
United States v. King.21 The Aroostook Potato Shippers' Association, a group of dealers in potatoes, blacklisted certain customers
whom they, for various reasons, considered undesirable, and circulated the list among members and non-members of the association. The court held that a cooperativeois not allowed to adopt a
secondary boycott or other measures which are monopolistic in
violation of the Sherman Act, and Sec. 6 of the Clayton Act is
no protection from a prosecution of such violation.
This case limits the Clayton Act to recognition of the cooperative form as a legal business entity, and not illegal per se as they
seemingly could be held under the Sherman Act.
The position of the agricultural cooperative under the federal
anti-trust laws after enactment of the Capper-Volstead Act and the
Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act is well illustrated by the
Borden case. 2 The five defendants were the milk distributor, a cooperative milk production association, the Milk Wagon drivers' union,
municipal officers, and arbitrators of the dispute between the producers and distributors. All were indicted under the Sherman Act
for engaging in a combination and conspiracy to restrain trade
and commerce in fluid milk among several states by fixing and
maintaining prices paid to the producer and charged to consumers, and controlling the supply of milk. The District Court dismissed the indictment stating that the Capper-Volstead Act gave
the producers authority to organize and fix and control prices in
marketing, and that only the Secretary of Agriculture had the
power to intervene, and he only when the price was unduly enhanced by such practices, and further that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act removed Farm Cooperatives entirely from
the Sherman Act. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the District Court, holding that these statutes have not superseded
the restrictions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act so far as cooperatives are concerned. The Capper-Volstead Act authorizes cooperatives to market collectively, but does not authorize cooperatives
to conspire with others--cooperative, corporation or individual,
1,2 250
1

F. 908 (Dist. of Mass. (1916)).
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 60 S. Ct. 182 (1939).
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to fix prices when such a conspiracy violates the Sherman Act.
As to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, the court pointed
out that the Secretary must act strictly within the procedure set
out, and when he so acts and an agreement is entered into, the
Sherman Act is not violated even though the cooperative is given
a monopoly position; but until there is such action by the Sectary of Agriculture, the cooperative is subject to the Sherman Act.
This and the statement of the Court
in U. S. v. Maryland and
23
Virginia Milk Producers Association:
A combination of producers and distributors to eliminate competition and fix prices at successive stages of
marketing of an agricultural product is not privileged
under the Capper-Volstead or Clayton Acts.
And a similar holding in the Columbia River Packers Association
v. Hinton,24 where the cooperative "labor union" of 90% of the
troll fishermen in the Washington and Oregon area sought to require purchasers to enter into an exclusive buying contract under
the protection of the Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, which
Act was patterned after the Capper-Volstead Act, were held to
be in violation of the Sherman Act, seem to justify the remark

by Kaminsky

:25

It thus appears that what at first seemed unlimited
legislative sanction of cooperative activity has been narrowly limited by judicial construction. The extra-judicial
powers conferred upon administrative officers must be
exercised in the prescribed manner. In the absence of
such official participation, cooperatives, in their marketing practices, are still subject to the anti-trust laws.
This appraisal of the situation has certainly not escaped the
keen eye of the leaders of the Farm Bloc, as stated by Professor
Mund :26
The very fact of their concerted action has given
such groups a considerable measure of political unity and
has enabled a number of them by means of unified pressure to secure an exemption from the anti-trust laws.
For a variety of reasons, however, Congress has been
repeatedly induced and persuaded to narrow the field covered by the anti-trust laws and to take long steps toward
the acceptance of a system of legalized private monopoly.
That such favors have been obtained from Congress in the
past by the Farm Bloc should prove to the most skeptical that,
" 179 F. 2d (1949).
24 315 U.S. 143, 62 S. Ct. 520

(1942).

1 29 Cornell Law Quarterly 251, 256.
'Note 1 supra, at p. 215.
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following setbacks at the hands of the judiciary, additional remedial legislation will be sought and obtained, as well as a continuing program of "educating the Supreme Court".
The foregoing briefly outlines the situation of the agricultural
cooperative at the present time in relation to the anti-trust laws.
It would appear that we can expect continuing pressure tactics
to be applied by the powerful Farm Bloc in Congress for favorable
legislation, and from past experience, it would appear that such
legislation will be forthcoming, the exact pattern, of course, is
impossible to foresee. That the Court is amenable to legislative
mandates is clearly indicated by Mr. Justice Black's statement
in the Associated Press Case :27
It is significant that when Congress has desired to
permit cooperatives to interfere with the competitive system of business, it has expressly done so by legislation.
No individual would be so naive as to assert that the average
individual farmer has any interest in obtaining a monopolistic
position, or has any interest in cooperative action other than
achieving a better economic position, that is, higher prices for
what he produces and lower prices on the items he must purchase.
Neither should any individual be so naive as to believe that the
leaders of the cooperative movement and of the Farm Bloc, just
as to the leaders of any so-called "Big Business", would not use
monopolistic practices to achieve those ends. Improvement of the
economic situation of the farmer is highly desirable, but a monopolistic control over the marketing of farm produce through closely
integrated agricultural cooperatives is as highly undesirable. The
ultimate conflict, economically speaking, is between the consumer
and the producer, and greatly overshadows the present labormanagement dispute. Continued growth of the cooperative movement under a favored legal position could very easily swing the
pendulum in favor of the agricultural producer, just as we have
seen an extreme in labor-management relations under pro-labor
legislation. Therefore, future legislative as well as judicial trends
should be watched with interest, as well as alarm.
It is submitted that legislative action to prevent agricultural
cooperatives obtaining monopolistic control of production of a
particular product should be directed at the following: (1) limitations on the right of cooperatives to federate to form common
marketing agencies; (2) prohibition of the establishment by cooperatives of production control on members; (3) limitation on
the size of cooperatives, either by area or percentage of total
production. It is felt that such legislation would preserve the
advantages of cooperation without sacrificing our basic economic
policy, a competitive market.
-326

U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 1416 (1945).
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AN ENQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL IDEAL OF
FREE COMPETITION IN ANTI-TRUST LAW
GEORGE F. BARBARY*
of the Denver Bar

In his Powell Lectures on Philosophy at Indiana University,1
Roscoe Pound summarized that the task of natural law is not to
give us an ideal body of universal legislation but to give us a
critique of the ideal element in the positive law. He reasoned that
"even if absolute ideals could not be proved, it could ascertain and
formulate the social ideal of the time and place and make it a
measure for choosing starting points for reasoning, of interpretation, and of applying standards." 2 That is, as Dean Pound
stated it, "We could have a natural law with a changing or a
growing content." 3 The function of the ideal for a society at a
given time then is to serve as the picture to which we refer our
problems of adjusting relations and ordering conduct. Thus the
ideals of the social order, made to serve for ideals of the legal
order and carried into detail as an ideal element in law, gradually
change with changes in the social order they portray.
In developing his thesis of social control through law, 4 Dean
Pound notes that medieval society, like the society of the Greek
city-state, had no place for free competitive self-assertion, and
that the ideal of a society of freely competing independent individuals grew up slowly following the Sixteenth Century and the
development of the modern economic order. 5 Following a proper
* Written while a student at University of Denver, College of Law.

Published for Indiana University by Yale University Press in 1942 as
"Social Control Through Law by Roscoe Pound."
I Pound, "Social Control Through Law," Yale University Press, New Haven
Conn., 1942, Page 5.
'Ibid. p. 6. For a thoroughly absorbing variation on the theme "Natural
Law as a function of time and standard of a given place," see Max M. Laserson's "Positive and Natural Law and Their Correlation" published in "Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies" edited by Paul Sayre, Oxford University Press, New York, 1947. Professor Laserson provides solid argument for
the proposition that what is habitually referred to as natural law is in reality
"socially adapted intuitive law." Professor Laserson suggests that positive law
has the highest degree of motivating power when it coincides with common law
consciousness, and he interchanges the concept of "common law consciousness"
with the concept "socially adapted intuitive law," which as has been shown, he
identifies as natural law.
'See Pound, op. cit. pages 7-12 for an enlightening presentation of the philosophical and sociological trends of the Twentieth Century, as revealed by the
leading exponents of various theories.
' For a comprehensive historical survey of the philosophies of the 18th and
19th Centuries, with particular emphasis on the conflict of social ideals, see
John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Making of the Modern Mind," Chapter XVII,
Houghton Mifflin Co., Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass. (Revised Edition,
1940) Professor Randall demonstrates that for the Industrial Revolution liberty
stood primarily for economic liberalism, individualism, free competition and
laisser faire.
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development of the historical facts, Dean Pound observes that
today "we are properly dissatisfied with the picture of the selfsufficient individual in an economically self-sufficient neighborhood and freely competing with his neighbors in an economic
order based on free competitive acquisition." 6 Dean Pound then
asserts that although this ideal governing the last century was
easily adapted to the economy, "we know very well that it is not
a true picture of the society of today." 7 Dean Pound concludes,
"But we cannot see an exact picture of that society to take the
place of the old picture." 8
While it might be pointed out that federal legislation in the
anti-trust field in the United States does not seem to sympathize
with Dean Pound's generalized conclusions (of abandonment of
the social ideal of freely competing individuals), it seems to this
writer that the suggestion in itself presents a very serious problem. Could it be that the suggestion is not so much a conclusion
based on historical fact as it is a prophecy? Is it that the social
ideal of the United States is not able to see an exact picture of
the society to take the place of the old picture; or is it that the
social ideal of the "old picture" is not yet fully developed? Are
we actually dissatisfied with the social ideal of freely competing
individuals, or are we simply adapting that ideal (natural law
with a growing content?) to a society whose economy is now based
on mass production and requires an adjustment of the ideal? If
this is the true picture, is it that in reality Dean Pound in ingeniously predicting that the present ideal will not function as we
know it, that it cannot so function, and that we are soon to be in
need of a new social ideal?
The reconciliation of liberty and order in the United States
has been difficult and frustrating, but thanks in part to the taughttradition of the lawyer and his conservative influence, that reconciliation has proceeded without abandoning fundamental concepts
for some type of collectivist apathy. However, when the writer
surveys the present state of anti-trust legislation (and interpretation), he is inclined to wonder if we are not approaching the
collectivist ideal of mass mediocrity as rapidly and perhaps as
fanatically as are our dedicated rivals. Do we, in the belief that
exaggerated free-competition best insures the preservation of our
fundamental concepts, actually promote the philosophical predisposition to abandon the energetic impulses and individual initiatives which gave birth to and nurtured those concepts? Does
"natural law with a changing and growing content" now demand
a modification of emphasis in our approach to anti-trust legislation?
In order to study the problem thoroughly, the entire field of
anti-trust legislation (and interpretation) should be examined.
Pound, op. cit. p. 15.
Ibid.

Ibid.
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This, of course, is impossible herein. But it is quite reasonable
to examine at least one phase of the field and come to some conclusion in that phase. The writer has chosen one aspect of the
Clayton Act for his microscopic observation and laboratory analysis. That aspect is brought to focus in the case of Standard Oil
of California v. United States,9 and it is with this case that Dean
Pound's observations will be tested.
The Standard Oil of California case arose under Section 3 of
the Clayton Act 10 which section is conveniently referred to as
the exclusive dealing and tying arrangement section. Professor
Louis B. Schwartz summarized the advent of the Clayton Act as
follows:
Monopoly survived the bite of the Sherman Act of
1890 in part because the courts held that the prohibition
of "restraint of trade" covered only "unreasonable" restraints, and further that a restraint was not unreasonable if imposed for recognized business purposes and
without obviously bad economic consequences. The Clayton Act of 1914 was supposed to put teeth in the old
Sherman Act gums by specifically naming and prohibiting the worst restraints-price discrimination, exclusive
dealing and merger of competing companies through acquisition of stock control. 1
The passage of Section 3 was accompanied by a great deal of
stormy debate and it would seem that out of that debate the Court
could well determine the limits which Congress intended the law
to encompass. 12 Whether this was so is another matter. The
Standard Oil Company of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
"38 Stat. 731 (1914); Title 15 U.S.C. Sec. 14 (1946). Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
•.. to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . or other commodi-

ties, whether patented or unpatented . . .on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods
. . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect . . .

may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce."
11Louis B. Schwartz, "Potential Impairment of Competition," 98 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 10, 11 (1949).
12 In
making this assertion the writer is not unmindful of such an admonition as was given by the Court in Van Camp v. American Can Company (278
U.S. 245, to the effect that the Court will not look behind legislation which is
clear on its face. It is felt that the admonition was not more than dicta, and
that while it may have applied to the problem at hand (i.e. any line of commerce) it is not the method of the Court to disregard legislative purpose as
revealed in the circumstances surrounding passage of a law.
But see Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, in
which case the section under consideration herein, Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, was determined to be so plain and apparent that it was unnecessary to
resort to reports of committees to ascertain its meaning.
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House version 13 would have prohibited all tying clauses and exclusive-dealing arrangements, and had that version become law,
doubt but that the arrangements would be
there would be 1little
"per se" illegal. 4 The Senate in turn would have confined tying
arrangement prohibitions to patented articles alone, 15 but the
compromise by conference resulted in a broad prohibition of both
tying arrangements and exclusive dealing wherever their effect
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." 16 The compromise was seen7
by one writer as a maneuver by the protectors of the status quo,'
and that writer asserts that the limitation "would seem to rule
out justification by motive or intent and would seem to clearly
refer to potential harm rather than actual effects." 18 Thus the allimportant clause readily became the handmaiden of the apologists
of the social ideal of exaggerated free competition, and at the
same time it became the limitation on that social ideal for the
"protectors of the status quo." It is significant then that Section 3
of the Clayton Act was not deemed by either side to command
that exclusive dealing agreements and tying arrangements were
illegal "per se."
Nor was such an absolutist interpretation given to Section 3
by the courts or the commissions 19 that considered it prior to
Standard Oil of Californiav. United States. In the General Motors
case, decided in 1935, the Court specifically developed the point
that tying arrangements under the Act are not illegal per se.
Moreover, when the Standard Oil of California case was before
District Judge Yankwich in 1948, he prefaced his opinion with
the statement,
I begin with the assumption that the General Motors
exclusive supply case is still the law. . . . At least under
the Clayton Act, an agreement by a dealer that . . . he

will not sell or offer to sell any products not manufactured or handled by the particular manufacturer, is not
20
per se illegal ...
"The bill passed by the House on June 5, 1914 contained the all-inclusive
prohibitions. (51 Congressional Record 9911, 1914).
'4 See for example the expression of Congressman Webb that any such contract in itself is in restraint of trade and tends to monopoly. (51 Congressional
Record 9072, 1914).
1551 Congressional Record 14276 (1914).
IsSee n. 10.
"7Louis B. Schwartz, op. cit. p. 11.
Is Ibid.

"Title 15 U.S.C., Sec. 21 gave enforcement authority to Section 14 (Section
3 of the Clayton Act) respectively in proper cases to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Federal Reserve Board, and, of course, the Federal Trade Commission. Appeal to the United States Circuit Courts was provided.
See 15 U.S.C., Sections 45 and 46 for the jurisdiction and powers of the
Federal Trade Commission.
" U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 78 F. Supp. 850, 857 (1948).
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It is of further significance that the courts and commissions
prior to the Standard Oil of California case did not consider a
mere possibility that competition would be lessened a sfficient
ground for holding the conduct complained of under Section 3
illegal. Thus in the Standard Fashion case the Court said:
But we do not think that the purpose in using the
word "may" was to prohibit the mere possibility of the
consequences described. It was intended to prevent such
agreements as would, under the circumstances disclosed,
probably lessen
21 competition, or create an actual tendency
to monopoly.
Moreover, as one writer expressed it, "For 35 years practically
all lawyers viewed the language of Section 3 of the Clayton Act
as embodying a 'rule of reason'." 22 Unquestionably this was the
view of Judge Augustus N. Hand in PictorialReview Company v.
Curtis Publishing Co., when he stated, "It has not been established
. that the defendant's contract referred to causes an unrea-

sonable restraint of trade.

....

",23

In the light of this legislative history and this subsequent
2 -4
judicial and administrative understanding and interpretation,
the Standard Oil of California case came to the Court. The case
arose 25 on a bill to enjoin the requirements contracts under which
"Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co. 258 U.S. 346. See also for
an early consideration of the elements of the offense, Signode Steel Strapping
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, C.C.A. 1942, 132 F. 2d 48.
21 H. Thomas Austern, "The Supreme
Court and Section 3 of the Clayton
Act" published in the 1950 edition of "Antitrust Law Symposium" by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. at pages 43, 44.
Only a month before the Standard Oil decision, a District Judge refused
to hold requirements contracts illegal without application of a "rule of reason."
In United States v. Linde Air Products Co., 83 F. Supp. 978, 981 (N.D. Ill.1949)
the court expressed the view which Mr. Austern felt was the then prevailing
view: "Having, therefore, concluded that the contracts are not illegal per se.
it remains for the Court to determine whether they otherwise constitute an
unreasonable restraint . " Mr. Austern may well be taken as the counterpart
to the apologist position taken earlier by Professor Schwartz. (See ante at
page 255). Thus while Professor Schwartz speaks of this Standard Oil of California case in terms of "the distinctive standards of the Clayton Act," (op. cit.
p. 11) Mr. Austern views with alarm the "degree of legal uncertainty" now
necessarily an incident of doing business. (op. cit. p. 51).
'3Pictorial Review Company v. Curtis Publishing Co., 255 Fed. 206, 210
(S.D. N.Y. 1917). See also United States v. Linde Air Products Co. supra for a
1949 interpretation by a Federal District Court in accord.
m4The writer cautions that the background presented herein is by no means
exhaustive. It does, however, fairly present a sufficient framework for the development of this thesis; it presents the background which points up the departure from tradition, which departure creates the problems with which we
are concerned in testing Dean Pound's observations on the social ideal.
Although the offense charged was restraint of trade in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act, and substantial lessening of competition and tendency to
create monopoly of a line of commerce in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, the decree below was upheld under the latter act alone. The Court decided it "need not go on to consider whether it might also be sustained by
Section 1 of the Sherman Act." 337 U.S. 293, 314.
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the Standard Oil Company of California supplied independent
filling station operators with petroleum products (and in some
cases, automobile tires, batteries and accessories) in a seven state
western area. The Court found that the company was the largest
seller of gasoline in the area; that in 1946 its combined sales
amounted to 23% of the total taxable gallonage sold there in
that year; that sales under exclusive dealing contracts constituted
6.7% of the total sales;' that retail service station sales by Standard's six leading competitors absorbed 42.5% of the total taxable
gallonage; that the remaining retail sales were divided between
more than seventy small companies; and that in 1948 only 1.6%
of retail outlets were what are known as "split-pump" stations.
The Court further found that exclusive supply contracts with
Standard had been entered into, as of March 12, 1947, by the
operators of 5,937 independent stations, or 16% of the retail
gasoline outlets in the Western Area, which purchased from
Standard in 1947, $57,646,233 worth of gasoline and $8,200,089.21
worth of other products. Although it was not specifically relied
upon by the Court, it was pointed out that some 8,000 contracts
and agreements of various types were in issue; and although the
Court seemed to ignore it later, it was shown that Standard's
share of tire and battery 2sales never exceeded 2% of the total
sales in the Western Area. ,
It was once said of Socrates that, while his opponents might
occasionally best him in argument, they could never do so if they
allowed him to frame the proposition. It seems to the writer that
the Court was cognizant of the method of Socrates in the Standard
case, for their very statement of the question forecast doom to
the company. The Court said,
The issue . . . is whether the requirement of showing that the effect of the agreements "may be to substantially lessen competition" may be met simply by proof
that a substantial portion of commerce is affected or
whether it must also be demonstrated that competitive
activity
has actually diminished or probably will dimin27
ish.
This followed a quotation of the lower court's opinion to the effect
that the practices herein injuriously affect "an appreciable segment of interstate commerce." 28 It soon developed that in light
of what the Court considered as "substantial," it probably mattered little which approach the Court adopted. The Court continued,
It is clear . . . that . . . the showing that Standard's requirements contracts affected a gross business
"337 U.S. 293, 295-296.
". Ibid. at 299.

Ibid. at 299 quoting from 78 F. Supp. 850, 874.
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of $58,000,000 comprising 6.7% of the total in the area
goes far toward supporting the inference that competi29
tion has been or probably will be substantially lessened.
The Court having turned the term "substantial effect" around to
mean "effect upon a substantial amount of business," then wound
up the bundle and tied it with another semantical twist by converting "proof of a probability" of lessening competition first to
an inference, as shown above, and then into a "bare inference"
that competition might be lessened.30 The Court then added for
good measure that the courts are ill-suited for resolving the problems if evidence be required to support the bare inference, 31 and
that there can be no proof that the use of requirements contracts
have actually reduced competition. 32 Finally, as if in justification, the Court reasoned that even if it be assumed that Standard
did not dominate the market and even if the contracts did not
improve Standard's competitive position, "it is possible that Standard's position would have deteriorated but for the adoption of
that system." 33 Sensing perhaps that philosophical idealism underlies the whole problem, the Court argued that, after all, "it is the
theory of the anti-trust laws that the long-run advantage of the
community depends upon the removal of restraints upon competition." 34 Thus inescapably we are brought face to face with
the social ideal of exaggerated free competition as a guiding star
of present anti-trust legislation and judicial interpretation,
with
3 5
which Dean Pound claimed we are properly dissatisfied.
What's to be said of the Court's attitude in the Standard case?
What's to commend the rejection of consideration of sound economic facts which would prove absence of relative domination in
the field? Is it perhaps that 6.7% control is a substantial lessening of competition? If the Court finds itself incapable of mastering the complex economic facts, and if this be not subject to
reproach, should the Court handle the problem at all or should
it commend the problem to Congress for clarification of standards?
If the Court does assume to decide the issue on the basis of the
statute as is, what is the justification for twisting the requirement
SIbid at 305.
"OThe series of judicial twists culminates in this coup de grace on page 309
of the opinion.
11In rejecting a plethora of evidence tendered, the Court also set forth and
rejected three other approaches to the problem: (1) Accepting evidence that
competition has flourished despite use of the contracts (here the Court merely
referred to Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp. without analysis of the
judicial method employed; (2) determining whether or not the contracts would
be in conformity with the length of their term to the reasonable requirement
of the field of commerce in which they were used; and (3) the company's degree
of market control.
2337 U.S. 293, 310.
SIbid at 309.
Ibid.
Supra.
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around so that now all that need be shown is a not insubstantial
effect? What's to be said for requiring only a bare inference where
prior anti-trust legislation sought a probability? What's to be
said of the social philosophy which the Court finds as underlying
all anti-trust legislation-what's to be said for the social ideal
of exaggerated free competition?
Law review writers have taken various positions. So also
have the four dissenting judges in the case. That the Standard
case represents a battleground in American social idealogical
thinking is indicated in dissenting Justice Douglas' opening remarks. He said, "The economic theories which the Court has
read into the Anti-Trust Laws have favored rather than discouraged monopoly." 36 Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the Court had
opened the door for the big companies to substitute an agency
relationship for what he thought was a relatively harmless exclusive supply relationship.3 7 Of course, apologists for the Court
are quick to point out that even this is favorable to current theories of free competition since under an agency relationship the
companies would be subject to greater liabilities (such as in tort
and under social security legislation). Professor Schwartz, for
example, justified the position taken by showing that it somehow
seems just that the companies should not have the advantage of
the same degree of control under legalized exclusive contracts in
avoidance of those greater liabilities."
From the standpoint of
the primary thesis of this study, it is important also that even
Mr. Justice Douglas did not dispute the social ideal of exaggerated
free competition. Moreover, in contradiction to Dean Pound's
observations, Mr. Justice Douglas would support the writer's
assertion that perhaps we have not yet achieved the social ideal,
for he stated, "The full force of the Anti-Trust Laws has not been
felt on our economy." 39 Is Dean Pound reporting what has already
occurred or is he prophesying that the social ideal cannot work?
While Mr. Justice Douglas' views were shared by Mr. Justice
Jackson, the latter judge had even more reasons for disagreement
with the Court. He felt that since the government had not established that either the actual or the probable effect of the accused
arrangement was to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly, Section 3 of the Clayton Act has not been
transgressed in law.4 0 This, of course, was no mere disagreement,
but a charge that the Court had constructed a piece of legislation
of its own. Mr. Justice Jackson in fact accused the Court of holding the contracts illegal per se, 41 which is a most monstrous devia337 U.S. 293, 315.
Compare Justice Douglas' position here with his disagreement with the
Court's conservative position in the Columbia Steel case (334 U.S. 495) and in
the Paramount case (334 U.S. 131).
Schwartz, op. cit. p. 15 ff.
'337

U.S. 293, 316.

Ibid at page 321.
4 Ihid at page 323.
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tion, since as has been shown this is precisely what the legislature
did not intend. 42 Of course, Mr. Justice Jackson felt that to substantially lessen competition means an entirely different thing
than to share a substantial amount of business activity. Moreover,
Mr. Justice Jackson perhaps was concerned with the possibility
of a need for a re-evaluation of our social ideal, for it seems to
this writer that the Justice was questioning the wisdom of the
whole approach to anti-trust legislation and interpretation. He
could not understand a philosophy which "applied the lash of antitrust laws to the backs of businessmen to make them compete,"
and then applied the same lash whenever they hit upon a successful method of accomplishing that competition. 43 It is significant
that this argument followed Mr. Justice Douglas' expressions that
in fact the exclusive contracts were the boon of the existence of
the independent station operators. 44 Thus we have here not only
a disagreement on constitutional interpretation, but in fact the
seeds of philosophical contradiction. Does the social ideal now
require a distinction between the different levels of business activity? Is it that the present ideal of free competition is adequate;
is it that the ideal is totally inadequate and doomed to failure
as Dean Pound would imply; or is it that some middle of the road
policy would now be in order? Should not the different levels
of business actively be considered subject to anti-trust legislation
solely within the sphere of their own activity? Then, of course,
if this is the solution, the initiative lies with the Congress, not the
Court, for after all the Act does say "in any line of commerce." 45
While it is little comfort to the businessman, his chagrin with
the Court's decision in the Standard Oil case is shared by the
majority of law review writers who have been able to control
their tempers long enough to offer opinions. Some suggestions,
too, are offered. William Lockhart and Howard R. Sacks are
among those who suggest that the Court should be urged to flatly
42 See the discussion of the legislative circumstances surrounding passage
of the Act, supra.
Is 337 U.S. 293, 324. William Simon of the Illinois Bar puts the plight of
the American businessman thus: "American businessmen who are faced with
the decision of whether to engage in vigorous competition with their competitors, or to follow what some economists call a 'live and let live policy' of consciously refraining from competition may make that decision with the assurance
that, whichever course they follow, they may well be sued." (William Simon,
"Meeting Price Competition," published in "Antitrust Law Symposium" 1950
edition printed by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. The criticism appear at page
53 of the Symposium.)
4One
law review writer, however, felt that Justice Jackson was not at all
concerned about the independent dealers. See Schwartz, op. cit. p. 16.
5 Title 15 U.S.C., Sec. 14. The pertinent portions of the section are set forth
above in note 10.
See Van Camp and Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, (1929), 49 S. Ct.
112, for the Supreme Court's interpretation that the phrase "in any line of
commerce" is clear on its face and means exactly what it says.
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overrule the Standard decision. 46 Or again several writers suggest the simple expedient of taking advantage of a change of the
Court to re-urge the question. Richard W. McLaren of the New
York and Illinois Bars attacks the confusion that the case has
caused, which seemed all the more pathetic to him since the decision, by inviting big business to avoid the restrictions through
agency arrangements, utterly fails to accomplish the purpose
which was the only justification for the confusion in the first
place. 47 (In case the reader is inclined to discount the authority
of the Standard decision, it would be well to point out that to
date there is no disposition on the part of the lower federal courts
to question the "share of commerce" test. 48 United States v. American Can Company,49 and United States v. Richfield Oil Corporation 50 are offered as examples.) Professor Oppenheim of the
George Washington University School of Law was concerned with
the rejection of factual data and analysis, and suggests the creation
of Industrial Advisory Committees to accept the responsibility
of amicus curiae. He further suggests exploitation of the Trade
Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Commission and coordination of a wide variety of authoritative information and
analysis on interrelated legal and economic issues.5 1 Certainly no
one would object to the method of a reasonable abandonment of
the rule of reason if the reasoning reveals its unreasonableness.
Then, of course, nearly all of the writers point out what
seems to this writer to be the most important aspect of the case
from a philosophical point of view, namely, that the Court inferentially made a distinction between big business and small business. That the Court seemed to be classifying business activity
on two levels is further shown by the importance which the Court
placed on the "widespread adoption of such contracts by Standard's competitors." 52 The writer feels justified in concluding that
this predisposition, however accidental or unconscious, evidences
that the deeper significance of the Standard Oil of Californiacase
"William

B. Lockhart and Howard R. Sacks. "The Relevance of Economic

Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of
the Clayton Act," 65 Harvard Law Review 913, 941

(1952).

This is by far the

most exacting and persuasive analysis of the exclusive arrangements question
which the writer has found. The research is thoroughly legalistic and the approach is

soundly economic.

11Richard W. McLaren, "Related Problems of Requirements Contracts and
Acquisition in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 45 Ill. Law
Review 141, 170. Mr. McLaren, sensibly, would hope for clarification from

Congress.
"The phrase does not refer to any "percentage" test, since it can hardly
be asserted that 2% or even 6.7% is a substantial relative share. There is
little doubt that the test is some amount of monetary size in itself.
"United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
'United States v. Richfield Oil Corporation, 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951).

"S.

Chesterfield

Oppenheim,

"A New

Look

at Antitrust

Enforcement

Trends," published in "Antitrust Law Symposium," 1950 edition, p. 69, printed
by Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
" 337 U.S. 293, 314.
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is in the re-evaluation of the social ideal of exaggerated free competition. Thus to the degree that the re-evaluation is smoldering
perhaps Dean Pound is justified in asserting that we are dissatisfied with our social ideal of the present day.5 3 And to that degree
also perhaps that social ideal either has or will fail. The writer
submits, however, that a proper division of the economy into the
several levels of business activity can preserve the social ideal
of free competition while at the same time it can stimulate rather
than destroy the energetic impulses and individual initiatives
which always have insured the preservation of our fundamental
American concepts.

INCOME TAX ON ALIMONY
SYDNEY E. SHUTERAN,
of the Denver Bar

Lawyers engaged in domestic relations and tax cases have
been confronted with doubt and uncertainty as to the taxability
of alimony received during the period for which an interlocutory
decree is effective. Another tax problem concerning the same period is the right of the husband and wife to file a joint return if,
at the end of the taxable year, a final decree of divorce has not
been entered.
The case of Alice Humphreys Evans v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,1 held that alimony received by the wife prior to
the entry of a final decree of divorce in the State of Colorado is
not taxable to the wife and, likewise, not deductible by the husband.
Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code prescribes the
circumstances under which alimony and separate maintenance payments are includable in the gross income of the wife. To qualify
under section 22(k) the payments must be received by the wife
under the following circumstances:
(a) The payments must be received by a wife who is divorced
or legally separated from her husband under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance.
(b) They must be periodic payments received subsequent to
such divorce.
(c) They must be in discharge of legal obligation imposed
upon or incurred by such husband.
(d) The legal obligation must be imposed or incurred because
of the marital or family relationship.
(e) Such obligation must be imposed or incurred under such
decree or under a written instrument incident to such
divorce or separation.
For Dean Pound's latest contribution to the field of social jurisprudence,
the reader is referred to the August, 1952 edition of the American Bar Association Journal in which the problem of the function of the law school is considered.
19 T. C., No. 126 (March 20, 1953).
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The Code provision does not define "divorce". In the Evans'
case, supra, the wife did not include in her gross income alimony
received during the effective period of the interlocutory decree of
divorce entered in the District Court in and for the City and
County of Denver, State of Colorado. As a result, a deficiency
assessment was levied by the revenue agent on the alleged grounds
of understatement of alimony income and determined in the assessment that the taxpayer occupied a single status for the entire
year which includes the period of time prior to the final decree
of divorce. A petition was filed with the Tax Court of the United
States for a re-determination of the deficiency. The Bureau interpreted "decree of divorce" as contained in section 22(k) to mean
an interlocutory decree of divorce and relied upon I. T. 3761 (C. B.
1945, 76) :
Advice is requested whether periodic payments received by a wife from her husband pursuant to an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of California are
includable in the gross income of the wife under section
22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code and deductible by
the husband under section 23(u) of the Code.
It is held that periodic payments made pursuant to
an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of California by a husband for the support of his wife are includable in her gross income under section 22(k) of the
Internal Revenue Code, and are deductible by the husband
under section 23(u) of the Code.
Whether an "interlocutory decree of divorce" effects a divorce of the parties and is therefore a true "decree of divorce"
depends upon its substantive effect on matrimonial status under
the pertinent local law. Whether an interlocutory decree of divorce creates a legal separation or is a form of decree of separate
maintenance also depends upon its real attributes as set forth in
the pertinent local law.
In the proceeding before the Court the pertinent local law
consisted of the statutes and decisions of the Courts of the State
of Colorado.
The Tax Court opinion in the Evans' case, supra, set out fully
sections 13 and 17 of Chapter 56, Volume 2, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated. These sections provide essentially that during
the interlocutory period the parties shall not be divorced and
that six months after the entry of an interlocutory decree, it shall
be and become a final decree of divorce. In determining the effect
of a Colorado interlocutory decree the Court cited the following:
If, during the period of the interlocutory decree, one
of the parties dies, the surviving spouse is entitled to letters of administration since the divorce action abates
with the death of one of the parties and there is no "status2
of marriage" upon which a decree of divorce can operate.
In re McLaughlin's Estate, 117 Colo. 67, 184 P. 2d 130 (1947).
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Under the statute and the express provisions of the interlocutory decree, the parties were still married 3and might lawfully
have cohabited together as husband and wife.
Although not referred to in the opinion, it was also argued
in the Evans' case, supra, that the property settlement agreement
provided for specific payments from the date of the interlocutory
decree to the date of the final decree, and provided separately for
the payments to be effective if and when the final decree was entered. As a result the alimony payments did not qualify as periodic payments required by section 22(k) because they were made
for a definite period of time and under the Code provisions are
considered to be "installment payments" and not "periodic payments". Consequently, there is no need in the preparation of a
property settlement agreement to provide separately for alimony
payments to be made during the period of the interlocutory decree unless the amount to be paid is to change upon the entry of
the final decree of divorce.
In the case of Martiner S. Eccles,4 the taxpayer's wife was
granted an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of Utah
on August 2, 1949, and the decree became final after the expiration of six months. The laws of the State of Utah are substantially the same as those of Colorado in regard to the entry of
the interloctutory and final decrees of divorce. The Tax Court
held that the taxpayer and his wife were still husband and wife
at the close of the taxable year 1949 and were thus entitled to file
a joint return under section 51(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Depending upon other conditions, it now will become necessary to determine whether or not you want the final decree to
enter prior or subsequent to the end of the taxable year. This
problem could result in a hitherto unknown eagerness to have an
interlocutory decree entered or, in the alternative, procrastination
greater than that for which lawyers are now noted.

NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR TO SPEAK
AT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
The Judicial Conference for the Tenth Circuit will be held
at the Stanley Hotel, in Estes Park, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, July 16, 17, and 18, 1953.
The banquet will be held Friday evening, July 17, at 7 p.m.
The speaker will be The Honorable Leslie Knox Munro, a native
of New Zealand, and now Ambassador to the United States from
that country. He is a permanent representative to the United
Nations.
Reservations should be made before July 13 with Mr. George
J. Stobie, Manager of the Stanley Hotel.
'Doty v. Doty, 103 Colo. 543, 88 P. 2d 573, 574 (1939).
S19 T. C ....... (March 11, 1953).
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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LICENSING AND REGULATING TAXICABS IS AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
AND MUST BEAR A REASONABLE RELATION TO THE
PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS OR WELFARE TO BE
VALID. Thus in the recent owner-driver taxicab case of City and
County of Denver v. Thrailkill,' both the individual and corporate
plaintiffs had brought an action for declaratory judgment asking
that the court define and determine the right, duties and status of
all parties in the light of an amended ordinance claimed to be invalid and unconstitutional and further requesting an injunction to
prevent the enforcement of the ordinance.
The owner-driver system of taxicab operations is one where
the taxicabs are owned by private individuals rather than by a
company, and the company obtains a master license and allows the
individual to use the company name, advertising facilities and
garage repairs in return for a flat fee. Prior to amendment the
owner-driver system was recognized by city council 2 by passing a
licensing and regulatory measure which covered this type of operation as well as company owned cabs and by the Colorado Supreme
CourtA The original ordinance provided for the issuance of master
licenses, licenses to drivers of taxicabs, revocation and renewal of
licenses and certain reasonable and necessary restrictions upon the
use of taxicabs within the city; all within the power of city council
to subject the operation of taxicabs to reasonable regulation in the
exercise of the police power. The power of municipalities, under
state law, to4 regulate the use of public streets in the interests of all
is conceded.
In 1950 city council amended Section 4 of the 1947 ordinance
by adopting ordinance 53 which prohibited the sale, transfer or
assignment of any master license and vested in the manager of
Safety and Excise the authority to renew licenses. In holding this
portion of the amended act constitutional, although the trial court
held contra, it was determined that the grant of a privilege to enter
a business is a personal and not a property right in the constitutional sense.5
There is a distinction between the delegation of power
to make a law and conferring authority or discretion in
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
......Colo ..... 244 P. 2d 1074 (1952).
Ordinance 165, Series of 1947.
International Brotherhood v. Publix Cab Company, 119 Colo. 208, 202 P.
2d 154 (1949).
'35 Colo. Stat. Ann., ch. 163, sec. 10, par. 7.
'Allen v. City of Kosciusko, 207 Miss. 343, 42 S. 2d 388 (1949).
2
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objection can be made.6
A statute that attempts to vest arbitrary discretion
and unlimited power with respect to lawful business,
without providing uniform rules and regulations, so that
the officials as well as those affected thereby
may govern
7
themselves accordingly, is unconstitutional.
By ordinance 109, Series of 1950, the city council purported
to prohibit the owner-driver system by amending section 15 of the
1947 ordinance to provide that:
No person shall drive or be permitted to drive a taxicab on the streets of the City and County of Denver for
business purposes unless such person is a licensed driver
who either is an operator or an employee of an operator
who is paid a fixed definite wage and/or a fixed commission based on the gross amount of fares received from
passengers. The Master License of any operator who shall
violate this Section may in the discretion of the Manager
be revoked or suspended in whole or in part as provided
in Section 6 hereof.
Further changes in section 18 which tended to show the intent
of the city council stated:
No taxicab license shall be granted to any operator
unless such operator is the bona fide, beneficial owner of
the taxicab ....
No taxicab license shall be issued to any
operator where such taxicab is to be hired, leased, rented,
or made the subject of a rental and purchase arrangement
to or with any driver thereof.
The question before the court was whether the passage of an
ordinance was within the authority of a municipality, in the exercise of the police power or otherwise, which abolished the ownerdriver system of taxicab operation by prohibiting the issuance of a
license to any applicant except the bona fide beneficial owner of the
taxicab and required the payment of a fixed wage or commission
based on the gross amount of fares received from passengers.
The defendant contended that the right of the city council to
control the use of the streets of the city by private persons for
private gain is plenary." No prior Colorado law having existed on
this point, the Court proceeded to set forth the rule for this jurisdiction to the effect that there is no authority in a municipality to
prohibit the use of the city streets by any citizen or corporation in
the carrying on of a legitimate business, harmless in itself and
useful to the community, which is independent of the police power
under which reasonable regulations may in the promotion of the

ILocke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 13 Ann. Rep. 716; Smith-Brooks Printing
Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 85 P. 2d 39 (1938).
1People v. Stanley, 90 Colo. 315, 9 P. 2d 288 (1932); People v. Harris, 104
Colo. 386, 91 P. 2d 989 (1939) ; Trujillo v. Walsenburg, 108 Colo. 427, 118 P.
2d 108 (1942).

'Atlantic Veterans Transportation, Inc. v. Jenkins, 203 Ga. 457, 47 S. E. 2d
324 (1948).
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public order, safety, health and welfare be proper.9 The test, therefore, is whether such regulation is reasonable and a proper exercise
of the police power. lO
The Court having dispensed with the rather unusual argument
of a city having plenary power, went on to consider whether Ordinance 109 was a valid exercise of the police power. As far back
as 1910, in the decision of City and County of Denver v. Curran,"
in which the city had passed an ordinance with regard to advertising billboards, the Court held that a municipal ordinance authorized by specific and definite legislative enactment, and not conflicting with any constitutional provision, will be sustained; but an
ordinance which a municipality assumes to pass under a general
grant of authority, or under incidental powers, must be reasonable,
fair and impartial, and not arbitrary or oppressive. In arriving at
such decision the Court stated:
It appears that the ordinance here under consideration has no real or substantial relation to the protection of
the public health, the public morals, or the public safety,
and imposes an unnecessary and unreasonable restriction
upon the use of private property; it commits, in some instances, the exercise of the municipality's legislative discretion to property owners and residents and in others,
entrusts such power to the caprice of certain of its officers,
and vests in them an absolute or despotic power to grant,
refuse or revoke the right to carry on an ordinary, legitimate business.
As later stated in Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners :12
To be valid, such legislation must bear a fair relation
to the public health, safety, morals or welfare and tend
to promote or protect the same.
The business of operating taxicabs is a property right and as
such is entitled to protection against municipal action, the effect
of which would be to deprive taxicab owners of their property without due process of law. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a somewhat similar ordinance in Victory Cab Co. v. Shaw. 13
However, that case is distinguishable in that the taxicabs were
owned by the company which obtained a franchise from the city
and then "farmed" them out to individual drivers, where in the
instant case the taxicabs were not owned by the companies to
which master licenses were issued. The Colorado Supreme Court
125 Amer. Juris., p. 544, sec. 253; 37 Amer. Juris., p. 533, sec. 19.
10Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 141 P. 132
(1914); Antlers Association v. Hartung, 85 Colo. 125, 274 P. 831 (1928) ; State
Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P. 2d 693 (1932) ; Sapero
v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568, 11 P. 2d 555 (1932) ; Lipset
v. Davis, 119 Colo. 335, 203 P. 2d 730 (1949).
1 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 261 (1910).
12Supra.

13232 N. C. 138, 59 S. E. 2d 573 (1950).
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rejected the argument used in that case choosing to follow instead
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge 14 holding invalid an ordinance requiring that every
pharmacy or drug store shall be owned only by a licensed pharmacist, because there was no relationship between mere ownership
of a drug store and the public health. So too the mere ownership
of a taxicab has no reasonable relation to the public health. Since
the amended portions of the ordinance are inseparably related, and
the main object of the ordinance-the destruction of the ownerdriver system is invalid, the other amendments cannot be sustained.
In the opinion of this writer, the Colorado Supreme Court has
once more indicated that regulations issued in pursuance of the
police power must be reasonable and must bear a reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare, safety or morals of the community to be valid.
R. KEYES.
-GERALDINE

EXPENSES OF MOVING IN EMINENT
DOMAIN CASES
FRED CALHOUN*

If land is condemned for public use by eminent domain, the
problem arises as to which party will bear the expense of moving
a building to another location. This particular question has not
been the cause of litigation in Colorado and has been settled in
but a few cases in the United States.
There is one good reason why this is true. State constitutions'
and statutes 2 establish a procedure to follow in condemnation proceedings. If these laws are faithfully followed, it is almost impossible to have "moving compensation" a question for the court
to decide. The Colorado statute, 3 which sets out the facts that a
jury or commissioners are to report, makes it mandatory to consider the values of a building for compensation purposes, whether
the building is to be removed or left on the property condemned.
However, before an owner is entitled to remove a building
from land that has been condemned, he must first reserve such
right in the preliminary proceedings. 4 It is also true that the
condemner can neither make the owner take the building 5 nor
deduct
remove the building to other property of the owner and
the value of the building from the damages to be paid. 6
'278 U. S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57 (1928).
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Colorado Constitution, Art. II, sec. 15.
2'35 C.S.A., Ch. 61.
sec. 18.
'IIbid.,
4
Corpus Juris, Eminent Domain, sec. 249. Lineburg v. Sandven et al, 21
N.W. 2d 808 (1946).
'Cumbaa v. Town of Geneva, 235 Ala. 423, 179 So. 277 (1938).
EState v. Miller, 92 S.W. 2d 1073 (1936).
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If, in spite of these precautions and obstacles, the question
must be litigated, the status of the owner of the building will
determine which one of two possible courses the owner should
pursue to recover damages. The theory of a tenant recovering
for removal is entirely different from the theory used to determine
damages when the owner of the building is also the owner of the
land.
In order for a tenant to receive damages, his rights as a tenant
must include some right to the building in question. This right
may arise from an agreement that the tenant may remove buildings at the end of his tenancy, from an agreement that the landowner will buy the buildings constructed by the tenant during
the tenancy, or even be a right arising after eminent domain proceedings have started, where the owner does not want the building
and the condemner does not have any use for it, but the lessee
elects to remove the same.
If the latter is the case, indications seem to be that the
amount of damages paid by the condemner should be lessened by
the fair market value of the building as it stood on the land, such
amount to be diminished by the cost of immediate removal because of necessity. This is a nice formula to determine the condemner's liability, but it leaves the owner of the building in the
position of losing property without compensation. In actual practice, however, the building is probably worthless to the owner or
the tenant has made arrangements with the owner so that the
building will be paid for in one form or another.
If the tenant has such rights as may permit him to remove
the building, three formulae have been developed to determine
damages. First, the damages are awarded as the cost of immediate removal. Second, the cost of removal is determined to be no
more than it would have been at the end of the tenancy for the
reason that the tenant would have to remove at that time and is
entitled to no compensation for moving now. Third, the tenant is
entitled to damages equal to the cost of immediately moving the
building, such amount to be lessened by the cost of removal at
the end of the term. The last method appears to be more fair to
both the tenant and the condemner and a majority of the courts
use this measurement. The first and second methods have both
been used but rarely.
Now, if the owner of the land wants to remove a building,
and all preliminary steps have been taken, the courts will allow
damages for removal. In this case two formulae have been developed. First, the amount will be the value of the land taken,
including the building, less the fair market value of the building,
such deduction to be lessened by the cost of moving. Second, the
amount will be the value of the land taken, including the building,
diminished by an amount equal to the difference in fair market
value of the building as it stood on the old location and as it
stands on the new location.
A close study of the two methods will show a discrepancy.
There are advantages under either method, but there are also
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disadvantages. The amount of recovery for moving one building
may vary greatly according to the theory used, but there can be
one situation where the recovery would be the same. To best illustrate this possibility, it may be well to turn to algebra. Letting D
equal damages, V as value, c as cost of removal, x as fair market
value on the condemned land, and y as fair market value in the
new location, we derive the following equations:
1-D equals V - (x - c)
2-D equals V - (x - y)
If at any time the cost of removal in the first method is equal
to the loss in fair market value in the second method, the recovery
will be identical.
A perplexing problem involved in the first method, in which
the cost of moving is allowed, is how far can the owner move the
building and what methods can he employ? Surely a mover could
not relocate the building two or three counties away and expect
moving expenses to be paid, nor could the condemner reasonably
expect the owner to move just across the property line unless
there were other controlling factors. Reasonableness is the answer. The owner should be allowed to move the building to a
new location, such location and cost of moving thereto to be within
reason.
The second theory has a disadvantage, even if the building
is moved only a reasonable distance. Suppose the building to
be moved has qualities which make it peculiarly suitable for a
certain use. By moving the building to another location where it
can be used for the same purposes, it is entirely possible that the
fair market value would be the same as before. Must the owner
then pay the moving costs? We can carry this example further. Let
us assume the new value far exceeds the old value. In this case
the owner is better off in that he has theoretically been compensated
for the cost of moving by the increase in valuation.
Another assumption, to bring out a point. Suppose the owner
of this building moves it to a location where the value of the
building, because of its restricted use, is nil. After settlement, is
he to be allowed to move the building to the location where the
value exceeds that of the original location? Can this not be termed
double collection?
Here, again, it seems that reasonableness is a requisite, not
only from the owner's point of view, but also from that of the
condemner's. The basic theory behind this method is to allow
the owner the cost of moving, and neither the owner nor the condemner should try to take too great an advantage lest the court
lean towards the other method.
With this reasoning and comparison of both methods, one
may draw the conclusion that there is no great difference in damages allowed in either case, especially when reasonableness is considered. With no reported case authority in Colorado, it may be
predicted that our court will probably strike a method which will
include one of the above, to be limited so that both the owner and
the condemner will have a fair assessment of damages.
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